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Liability of Accountants Under Securities
Exchange Act of 1934
(INCLUDING AMENDMENTS TO SECURITIES ACT OF 1933)

By Spencer Gordon

At a meeting of the American Institute of Accountants at New
Orleans, October 17, 1933, a paper was read entitled Accountants
and the Securities A ct. This dealt with the problems of accountants
under that statute, the origin and extent of their responsibility,
the defenses available to them in case of suit and the extent of
their liability. The address was afterwards published in The
Journal of Accountancy for December, 1933.
Title 2 of the securities exchange act of 1934 (which I shall call
the 1934 act) contains certain amendments to the securities act
of 1933 (which I shall call the 1933 act) which make substantial
changes in the liability of accountants under that statute. With
out repeating what has already been said in the article A ccountants
and the Securities Act, I shall here attempt to state what these
changes are. Title I of the 1934 act also imposes certain new
liabilities, and I shall discuss these briefly.
Amendments to Securities Act of 1933
Prima-facie case

In any action against an accountant under section 11of the
1933 act, before the recent amendments, the plaintiff must sustain
the burden of proof that there has been, in the part of the registra
tion statement attributed to the accountant, an untrue statement
of a material fact or the omission to state a material fact required
to be stated in the registration statement or necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading, and the plaintiff must also
sustain the burden of proof that he has acquired such security, and
that the accountant has with his consent been named as having
prepared or certified the statement which is the subject of the
suit. If the plaintiff establishes these facts, the burden of proof is
then imposed on the defendant to establish the defenses allowed
under section 11 (b), which have been discussed fully in the paper
Accountants and the Securities Act.
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Section 206 of the 1934 act amends the securities act of 1933 as
follows:
“Sec. 206 (a), section 11 (a) of such act is amended by adding
after the last line thereof the following new sentence: “If such
person acquired the security after the issuer has made generally
available to its security holders an earning statement covering a
period of at least twelve months beginning after the effective date
of the registration statement, then the right of recovery under this
subsection shall be conditioned on proof that such person acquired
the security relying upon such untrue statement in the registration
statement or relying upon the registration statement and not
knowing of such omission, but such reliance may be established
without proof of the reading of the registration statement by such
person.’”

This provision is self-explanatory and adds another requirement
which must be met by the plaintiff in such cases as fall with the
amendment. The burden is on the plaintiff to make the proof
required. This amendment is thus beneficial to accountants.
Proof of Belief in Certain Cases
In the article Accountants and the Securities Act attention was
called to the fact that in a balance-sheet or profit-and-loss state
ment certified by an accountant there may be items as to which he
indicates that he in turn has relied upon another expert, or that
the accountant’s certificate may in part purport to be a statement
made by an official person or a copy of or an extract from a public
official document.
The provisions of the statute have been changed in regard to
such cases. Section 206 (b) of the 1934 act amends section 11 of
the 1933 act as follows:

“ (b) Clauses (C) and (D) of paragraph (3) of section 11 (b) of
such act are amended to read as follows: ‘ (C) as regards any part
of the registration statement purporting to be made on the
authority of an expert (other than himself) or purporting to be a
copy of or extract from a report or valuation of an expert (other
than himself), he had no reasonable ground to believe and did not
believe, at the time such part of the registration statement be
came effective, that the statements therein were untrue or that
there was an omission to state a material fact required to be stated
therein or necessary to make the statements therein not mislead
ing, or that such part of the registration statement did not fairly
represent the statement of the expert or was not a fair copy of or
extract from the report or valuation of the expert; and (D) as re
gards any part of the registration statement purporting to be a
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statement made by an official person or purporting to be a copy of
or extract from a public official document, he had no reasonable
ground to believe and did not believe, at the time such part of
the registration statement became effective, that the statements
therein were untrue, or that there was an omission to state a
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make
the statements therein not misleading, or that such part of the
registration statement did not fairly represent the statement
made by the official person or was not a fair copy of or extract
from the public official document.’”

Before the amendment the 1933 act read:
“. . . he had reasonable ground to believe and did believe
. . . that the statements therein were true and that there was no
omission . . . or . . . that such part of the registration state
ment fairly represented ... or was a fair copy . . .”

The change of language from positive to negative will apparently
result in defendants’ being held in the middle class of cases where
there was reasonable ground to believe that the statements were
true and that there was no omission, or that they fairly repre
sented, or were fair copies; but there also existed some reasonable
ground for believing the contrary. In such cases defendants
would have escaped liability under the 1933 act, but will be held
under the amendment. To put it simply, it seems to me that it
will be more difficult to sustain the burden of proof that there has
been no reasonable ground to believe a statement untrue than to
sustain the burden of proof that there has been reasonable ground
for believing it true. (Arthur H. Dean, in Fortune September,
1934, disagrees with this view, but it seems to me that the burden
now required of defendants under clauses (C) and (D) is very
similar to the burden of proof imposed on the state in criminal
cases, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.)
It should be noted, however, that there has been no change in
the language of section 11 (b) (3) (B) of the 1933 act which deals
with the situation that usually is presented in a suit against an
accountant. This section remains as follows:
. . as regards any part of the registration statement pur
porting to be made upon his authority as an expert or purporting
to be a copy of or extract from a report or valuation of himself
as an expert, (i) he had, after reasonable investigation, reason
able ground to believe and did believe, at the time such part of
the registration statement became effective, that the statements
therein were true and that there was no omission to state a
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material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make
the statements therein not misleading, or (ii) such part of the reg
istration statement did not fairly represent his statement as an
expert or was not a fair copy of or extract from his report or valua
tion as an expert”; (Section 11 (b) (3) (B).)

Standard

of

Reasonableness

In the article Accountants and the Securities Act the standard of
reasonableness provided by section 11 (c) of the 1933 act was
discussed. By section 206 (c) of the 1934 act this subsection has
been amended to read as follows:

“‘(c) In determining, for the purpose of paragraph (3) of
subsection (b) of this section, what constitutes reasonable in
vestigation and reasonable ground for belief, the standard of rea
sonableness shall be that required of a prudent man in the
management of his own property.’”
This amendment is an improvement in that it removes the doubt
ful language of the former section that “the standard of reason
ableness shall be that required of a person occupying a fiduciary
relationship.”

Damages

The section of the 1933 act in regard to damages has been
completely changed by the 1934 act to read as follows:
“(d) Subsection (e) of such section 11 is amended to read as
follows:
“‘(e) The suit authorized under subsection (a) may be to
recover such damages as shall represent the difference between the
amount paid for the security (not exceeding the price at which the
security was offered to the public) and (1) the value thereof as of
the time such suit was brought, or (2) the price at which such
security shall have been disposed of in the market before suit, or
(3) the price at which such security shall have been disposed of
after suit but before judgment if such damages shall be less than
the damages representing the difference between the amount paid
for the security (not exceeding the price at which the security was
offered to the public) and the value thereof as of the time such
suit was brought: provided, that if the defendant proves that any
portion or all of such damages represents other than the deprecia
tion in value of such security resulting from such part of the regis
tration statement, with respect to which his liability is asserted,
not being true or omitting to state a material fact required to be
stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading, such portion of or all such damages shall not be
recoverable. ... In any suit under this or any other section of
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this title the court may, in its discretion, require an undertaking
for the payment of the costs of such suit, including reasonable
attorney’s fees, and if judgment shall be rendered against a party
litigant, upon the motion of the other party litigant, such costs
may be assessed in favor of such party litigant (whether or not
such undertaking has been required) if the court believes the suit
or the defense to have been without merit, in an amount sufficient
to reimburse him for the reasonable expenses incurred by him, in
connection with such suit, such costs to be taxed in the manner
usually provided for taxing of costs in the court in which the suit
was heard.’ ”

This amendment removes the ambiguous language of section 11
(e) of the 1933 act which was discussed at length in the article
Accountants and the Securities Act. The amended section seems
reasonably clear. The recovery of the consideration paid for the
security is eliminated, and liability is restricted to the recovery of
damages measured by losses the basis of which is clearly set forth
and not left to conjecture as in the 1933 act. The amendment
further restricts the damages to
"the depreciation in value of such security resulting from such
part of the registration statement, with respect to which his liabil
ity is asserted, not being true or omitting to state a material fact
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements
therein not misleading. . . .”
but places the burden on the defendant on this point. The court
may require an undertaking from and may assess costs and at
torney’s fees against the defendant as well as against the plaintiff.
This amendment to section 11 (e) of the 1933 act is a decided
improvement from the standpoint of the accountants, and it takes
care of much of the criticism of the 1933 act. The provision as to
burden of proof is disappointing but is relatively unimportant
compared to the clarification of the damage question and restric
tion of damages to depreciation in value resulting from the mis
statement or omission.
Section 11 (g) of the securities act of 1933 becomes nugatory in
view of the provisions of the amendment to section 11 (d).
Limitation
By section 207 of the 1934 act, the provisions as to limitation on
suits are changed to read as follows:

"No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created
under section 11 . . . unless brought within one year after the
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discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after such
discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable
diligence ... In no event . . . more than three years after the
security was bona fide offered to the public.”

By the 1933 act, the limitations had been two years and ten years
respectively.
Reliance

on

Regulations

Section 209 (b) of the 1934 act amends the 1933 act as follows:
“ (b) Subsection (a) of such section 19 is further amended by
adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: ‘No provi
sion of this title imposing any liability shall apply to any act done
or omitted in good faith in conformity with any rule or regulation
of the commission, notwithstanding that such rule or regulation
may, after such act or omission, be amended or rescinded or be
determined by judicial or other authority to be invalid for any
reason.’”
No such provision was contained in the 1933 act, and this amend
ment should be effective in protecting an accountant who relies on
the rules and regulations of the commission.

Liability Under Securities Exchange Act

of

1934

Up to this point I have been discussing the 1934 act only so far
as it amended the 1933 act. There is also in the securities act of
1934 an express provision regarding liability arising under that
statute as follows:
“Sec. 18. (a) Any person who shall make or cause to be made
any statement in any application, report, or document, filed
pursuant to this title or any rule or regulation thereunder, which
statement was at the time and in the light of the circumstances
under which it was made false or misleading with respect to any
material fact, shall be liable to any person (not knowing that such
statement was false or misleading) who, in reliance upon such
statement, shall have purchased or sold a security at a price which
was affected by such statement, for damages caused by such
reliance, unless the person sued shall prove that he acted in good
faith and had no knowledge that such statement was false or
misleading. A person seeking to enforce such liability may sue
at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction. In any
such suit the court may, in its discretion, require an undertaking
for the payment of the costs of such suit, and assess reasonable
costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, against either party
litigant.
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“ (b) Every person who becomes liable to make payment under
this section may recover contribution as in cases of contract from
any person who, if joined in the original suit, would have been
liable to make the same payment.
‘‘ (c) No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability
created under this section unless brought within one year after the
discovery of the facts constituting the cause of action and within
three years after such cause of action accrued.”
It seems to me that this section 18 (a) of the 1934 act is less drastic
and more equitable than the rather involved provisions of the
1933 act, even as now amended. Some of the differences are the
following: (1) Under the 1934 act the statement must be at the
time and in the light of the circumstances in which it was made
false or misleading with respect to a material fact. Under the
1933 act, as amended, a suit may be instituted

“in case any part of the registration statement, when such part
became effective, contained an untrue statement of a material
fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated
therein or necessary to make the statements therein not mislead
ing.”
(2) Under the 1934 act the person suing must have acted “in
reliance upon such statement.” Under the 1933 act as amended,
reliance is required only
“If such person acquired the security after the issuer has made
generally available to its security holders an earning statement
covering a period of at least twelve months beginning after the
effective date of the registration statement.”

(3) Under the 1934 act only “damages caused by such reliance ”
can be recovered. This is perhaps also true under the involved
language of the 1933 act as now amended, but the burden is
placed on the defendant to show that the damages claimed did not
result from the statement.
(4) Under the 1934 act, the defendant may escape liability by
proving that he “acted in good faith and had no knowledge that
such statement was false or misleading.” In the article Account
ants and the Securities Act and in this article I have discussed the
rather involved defenses under the 1933 act.
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